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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, } 
) PETITION FOR WRIT 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) OF CERTIORARI 
v, } 
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY, ) Case No. 
Defendant-Petitioner. ) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in failing to effect 
the rule of law articulated by this court in Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (1985) and Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 
1987) wherein three factors must be considered and incorporated 
into Findings of Fact in awarding a party alimony? 
II. Does the effect of the opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals relative to how the court should receive a Child Support 
Worksheet Schedule pursuant to §78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended) put it in conflict with Rules 801(a) and (b) , 802, 803, 
901 and 902, Utah Rules of Evidence? 
III. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in failing to effect 
the rule of law articulated by this court in Delatore v. Delatore, 
680 P. 2d 27 (Utah 1984) wherein it did not reverse and strike 
attorney's fees awarded to plaintiff/appellee? 
IV. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in failing to grant 
defendant/appellant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Defendant/husband petitions this court for review by a Writ of 
Certiorari of the decision and judgment of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Foxley v. Foxley, Civil No. 890493-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Exhibit "A" - Appendix. 
The court affirmed the decision and implemented the order of 
Judge Richard Moffat holding that he did not abuse his discretion 
in modifying a Decree of Divorce raising alimony from $10.00 per 
month to $1,350.00 per month without termination date, awarding an 
increase of child support from $450.00 per month to $1,547.00 per 
month (3 children), denying defendant's post trial motions for a 
new trial and Motion to Dismiss. The court did reverse the award 
of attorneyfs fees and remand for a determination of their amount. 
Foxley, (supra). 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
entered in this matter December 3, 1990, is vested in the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, §3; Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(2) (1987); and R. Appellate Procedure 42, 43 & 45. 
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CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
The following provisions of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-1(1), §30-3-
5(3), §78-45-7 (1989); Rules 801(a) and (b) , 802, 803 and 902, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
30-3-1(1). Procedure - Residence - Grounds. 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided 
in this chapter. 
30-3-5(3). Disposition of property - Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction - Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony -
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support - Rebuttable 
guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted 
by prior court order unless there has been a material change of 
circumstance on the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in 
circumstances has occurred, the court determining the amount of 
prospective support shall reguire each party to file a proposed 
3 
award of child support using the guidelines before an order 
awarding child support or modifying an existing award may be 
granted. (Emphasis added). 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the 
guidelines, the court shall establish support after considering all 
relevant factors including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the 
child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of 
others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall 
determine and assess all arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the 
obligee, if any; and 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily 
expended in support of spouse and children. 
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
4 
(a) Statement. A "statement11 is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a 
statement. 
Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. Hearsay Rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules. 
Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence. Hearsay exceptions; 
availability of declarant immaterial. 
See Exhibit "B" - Appendix. 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. Requirement of 
authentication or identification. 
See Exhibit "B" - Appendix. 
Rule 902, Utah Rules of Evidence. Self-authentication. 
See Exhibit "B" - Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, former husband to Respondent (hereafter cited as 
"husband") petitions this court for review by a Writ of Certiorari, 
the opinion issued by the Utah Court of Appeals affirming all 
aspects of a modification of a Decree of Divorce except a reversal 
and remand of attorneyfs fees granted by Judge Richard Moffat, 
judge of the Third District Court. 
The trial court entered an Order increasing alimony from 
$10.00 per month to $1,350.00 per month, increasing child support 
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from $450.00 per month to $1,547.00 per month and awarding wife 
$4,394.00 as and for attorney's fees. 
The husband filed several post trial motions which were 
denied. 
The husband then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals and 
a subsequent Petition for Rehearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
all aspects of the modification granted by the trial court with the 
exception that it reversed the award of attorney's fees and 
remanded the matter back to the trial court for a determination of 
the amount of attorney's fees. 
The husband petitions this court for review by Writ of 
Certiorari from that decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on October 8, 1976. 
The marriage of the parties was terminated by Decree of 
Divorce entered on August 22, 1983. 
In June, 1984, the husband requested a court order for the 
wife to appear and show cause why she should not be found in 
contempt of court for denying defendant visitation, wife filed a 
counterclaim asking for increase in child support, alimony and 
attorney's fees. 
The conflicting positions of the parties came on for trial on 
September 22, 1988, which was continued to March 7, 1989, before 
the Honorable Richard Moffat presiding. 
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In this case, the wife submitted a Child Support Worksheet 
after her case was closed. 
The Worksheet was submitted without foundation and without 
determining or deducting business expenses or insurance 
contributions. The Worksheet was received by Judge Moffat over 
objection by the husband who ruled that the Worksheet could be 
submitted at any time. See Exhibit "C" - Appendix (pg. 112, lines 
13-25; pg. 113, lines 1-4). 
A statement designated as attorney!s fees was also submitted 
after her case was closed. The statement was submitted without 
foundation or testimony and was objected to by the husband. See 
Exhibit "D" - Appendix (pg. 113, lines 16-25; pg. 114, lines 1-25). 
Ten days later a document dated March 16, 1989 titled 
"Supplement to Attorney's Fees of Robert Hughes" was submitted and 
received over the objection of husband. See Exhibit "E" -
Appendix. 
The trial court ordered child support increased from $450.00 
per month (3 children) to $1,547.00 per month,increased alimony 
from $10.00 per month to $1,350.00 per month, ordered husband to 
provide health and dental insurance and awarded wife $4,394.00 in 
attorneyfs fees. 
In May, 1989, the husband brought several post judgment 
motions including a Motion to Set Aside Verdict, Motion for New 
Trial, Objection to Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law, Motion to 
Dismiss because of perjury of wife. These motions were denied on 
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August 7, 1989. See Exhibit "P" - Appendix. On August 21, 1989, 
the husband filed an Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. On 
October 12, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's decision except it reversed the award of attorney's fees 
and remanded it back to the trial court to determine an amount. On 
October 26, 1990, the husband filed a Request for Rehearing. This 
petition was denied on December 3, 1990. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO EFFECT THE 
RULE OF LAW ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT IN JONES V. JONES, 
700 P.2D 1072 (1985) AND RUHSAM V. RUHSAM, 742 P.2d 123 
(Utah App. 1987), WHEREIN THREE FACTORS MUST BE 
CONSIDERED AND INCORPORATED INTO FINDINGS OF FACT IN 
AWARDING A PARTY ALIMONY. 
This court should grant husband a review by Writ of Certiorari 
on the grounds that the ruling by the Court of Appeals is contrary 
to decisions of this court and other decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
This court ruled specifically in Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072 
(1985) and the Utah Court of Appeals in Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 
123 (Utah App. 1987), that there must be clear rationale for the 
level of alimony awarded to a party and that the court must 
consider three criteria in determining the level of alimony. 
The trial court failed to specify anything in its findings nor 
was there any evidence offered that would let the court fashion a 
dollar amount rationally related to the needs of the wife so the 
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court could set the alimony amount at $1,350.00 per month. See 
Exhibit "6" - Appendix. 
Under Jones (supra) , the first prong of the three part test is 
that the court has to ascertain the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife. This necessarily has to be stated in terms of dollars 
and cents so that the court can assess the second prong as to 
whether the wife could produce enough income to meet her needs. 
The Appellate Court held that test was met because the court 
found that "...Mrs. Foxley and the children had experienced some 
serious hardships and had been on public assistance even though 
Mrs. Foxley had done an admirable job in performing her 
responsibilities". Foxley, (supra). Exhibit "A" - Appendix. 
Husband argues that under Jones, (supra), and Ruhsam, (supra), 
that the wifefs needs specifically be expressed in terms of a 
dollars and cents finding so the court can rationally fashion an 
alimony level and further see if the husband can financially meet 
the level. It is reversible error not to make such specific 
findings. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). 
II. THE EFFECT OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
RELATIVE TO HOW THE COURT SHOULD RECEIVE A CHILD SUPPORT 
WORKSHEET PURSUANT TO §78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended) PUTS IT IN CONFLICT WITH THE UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULES 801(a) AND (b) , 802, 803, 901 
and 902. 
In this case, the wife submitted a Child Support Worksheet 
after the case was closed, without foundation and without deducting 
9 
business expenses or insurance contributions of the husband 
pursuant to §78-45-7 (1953, as amended). 
Even though this section went into effect on April 24, 1989 
after the trial on March 7, 1989, the court stated that by law he 
was required to accept the Worksheet (see Exhibit "C" - Appendix; 
pg. 112, lines 23-25) and its Finding No. 21 indicated that the 
child support amount would be set as "...reflected in the judicial 
districts support guidelines." See Exhibit "G" - Appendix. 
The husband argued in his Brief to the Court of Appeals that 
the Child Support Worksheet was hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(a), 
801(b), 802 and 803, Utah Rules of Evidence, was not admissible and 
not within any of the exceptions as provided by Rule 901 and 902. 
Further, the husband argued that the wife laid no foundation, but 
merely submitted it to the court after resting her case. See 
Exhibit "C" - Appendix. 
The Court of Appeals did not address this issue in its written 
opinion. 
The husband moved for a rehearing arguing the court had 
overlooked this issue and requested a ruling. The Court of Appeals 
denied the husband's request for a rehearing. 
The husband does not argue the technicality that §78-45-7, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), was not in effect at the 
time of trial because both parties submitted Worksheets. 
The trial judge was under the impression that the Worksheet 
could be submitted at anytime and the court was required by law to 
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accept one. Such an approach puts §78-45-7(2), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended), in direct conflict with the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Section 78-45-7(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
provides: 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a 
material change in circumstances has occurred, 
the court determining the amount of prospec-
tive support shall require each party to file 
a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child 
support or modifying an existing award may be 
granted. 
The husband would argue that evidentiary safeguards should not 
be overlooked and that a modification of child support is a 
proceeding in divorce and should be conducted pursuant to the Rules 
of Evidence. 
Section 30-3-1(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
provides: 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced 
and conducted as provided by law for 
proceedings in civil causes, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
The failure of the Court of Appeals to make a ruling on this 
issue leaves the state of the law unclear. 
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III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE 
TRIAL COURTfS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO LAW AS 
ENUNCIATED BY THIS COURT IN DELATORE V. DELATORE, 680 
P.2d 27 (1984) . 
At the end of trial, the wife made a proffer over the 
objection of the defendant of attorney's fees. See Exhibit "D" -
Appendix (pg. 114, lines 7-25; pg. 115, lines 1-9). 
The wife proffered that attorney's fees were $3,000.00. See 
Exhibit "D" - Appendix (pg. 115, lines 1-4). 
This amount was admitted over objection of defendant. 
Ten days after the trial counsel for husband received a 3-page 
document, dated March 16, 1989, entitled supplement to attorney's 
fees of Robert Hughes. See Exhibit "E" - Appendix. 
The document was not in affidavit form and instead of 
$3,000.00 previous balance, showed a balance of $3,180.00. 
The amount due on the bottom of the statement attachment was 
$4,394.25. 
This is the figure that the court used in its award of 
attorney's fees without further hearing or evidence. 
The Utah Court Appeals found that "...Mr. Foxley does not 
challenge Mrs. Foxley's need or entitlement to an award of 
attorney's fees and costs..." Foxley, (supra), Exhibit "A" -
Appendix (pg. 5) and reversed the award and remanded it back to the 
trial court for a determination of amount only. 
The law in Utah is that an award of attorney's fees must be 
based on evidence showing first that there is a financial need of 
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the person receiving the award and second that the award is 
reasonable. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d, 1076 (Utah 1988); Porco 
v. Porco, 752 P.2d (Utah App. 1988). 
On page 39 of his Brief, the husband argued that the wife did 
not put on evidence of need for attorneyfs fees. This is contrary 
to the opinion of the Appellate Court that the husband did not 
challenge the need or entitlement of the wife to attorney's fees. 
The burden of proof of need and entitlement is on Respondent not 
Appellate. Mr. Foxley did challenge this fact in his Brief that 
Mrs. Foxley did not meet her burden of proof as to need as required 
by Utah case law. Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984); 
Warner v. Warner, 655 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982); Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). 
The husband made a motion for rehearing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals and requested the court to review his Brief because he had 
challenged this issue both at trial and in his Brief. The Court of 
Appeals denied the husband's motion. 
Delatore, (supra), is factually similar to this case at bar. 
There this court ordered that the award of attorney's fees 
should be stricken because the only reference in the record to 
attorney's fees were in opening and closing statements that they 
were requested. 
This court pointed out the long list of precedent whereby the 
evidentiary requirement is testimony regarding the necessity of the 
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate changed 
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in light of the difficulty of the case and the rates commonly 
charged in the community. The wife admits that there was no 
evidence, but argues the court took judicial notice of these facts. 
Clearly the Court of Appeals erred in not striking the award of 
attorney's fees. 
Further, the Court of Appeals is not consistent in applying 
the standard. 
In Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah 
Court of Appeals reversed an award of attorney's fees when the 
wife's counsel proffered testimony and produced an exhibit 
itemizing the time and costs expended and the hourly rates charged. 
The court reversed the award of attorney's fees because there was 
no evidence regarding the "...necessity of the number of hours 
dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the 
difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates 
commonly charged for divorce action in the community...." The case 
at bar is factually the same. The Court of Appeals should have 
stricken the award of attorney's fees under Talley, (supra). 
The husband seeks a Writ of Certiorari from this court to 
reverse and strike the award of attorney's fees. 
IV. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REMAND THIS 
MATTER BACK TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT 
TO RULE 59, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any 
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of the parties and on all or part of the issues, 
for any of the following causes... 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the...adverse party... 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial... 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law...." 
The husband in a post judgment motion in District Court 
presented the court with affidavits by one Robert Farr that 
plaintiff had committed perjury at trial in at least the following 
particulars (Exhibit "H" - Appendix): 
(1) Plaintiff in discovery and at trial represented that 
she had one bank account when she in fact had a secret bank 
account that she ran money through. 
Defendant alleges that an attorney that plaintiff 
socialized with advised her not to disclose the existence of 
the account. 
(2) Plaintiff in discovery and at the time of trial 
asked plaintiff to disclose her assets. Plaintiff failed to 
disclose that she had purchased an airplane having invested 
$4,500.00 in said asset. 
Defendant claimed that this fact was material as 
plaintiff represented that she was in need of alimony. 
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(3) Plaintiff in discovery and in trial represented that 
her home was in substantial disrepair and that she did not 
have adequate funds to repair the same. After trial she 
submitted a bill to the underlying mortgage holder that she 
had expended $19,000.00 towards improvements on the home that 
she had testified she needed alimony to make. This perjury on 
its face. 
Because of these accusations by the adverse party, the trial 
judge should have ordered an evidentiary hearing as requested by 
the husband or held plaintiff in contempt of court and ordered a 
new trial or dismissed plaintiff's petition. 
Even assuming that defendant did not commit perjury, the above 
evidence would constitute new evidence not available at trial. 
In defendant's motion for new trial based on the foregoing, 
defendant was asked why he could not have discovered that plaintiff 
had purchased an airplane for $4,500.00. 
Defendant responded by indicating to the court that three (3) 
weeks after the trial, defendant's counsel was contacted by a 
person whom plaintiff was suing over the airplane. 
Plaintiff's response is contained in the transcript and her 
counsel characterizes the airplane situation as "...a more thorny 
issue" (Exhibit "I" - Appendix (pg. 53, lines 7-8) and argues if 
there was error in failure to disclose it should be harmless error. 
Defendant would emphatically emphasize that one of the major 
issues was the needs of the plaintiff. Certainly if the plaintiff 
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shelled out $4,500.00 for an airplane, $19,000.00 for home 
improvements, intentional failure to disclose these items is not 
harmless error. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in its opinion made the following 
comments: 
"Mr. Foxley also moved for a new trial, 
pointing to evidence unearthed after trial 
concerning Ms. Foxleyfs assets. Ms. Foxley is 
said to have expended $4,500.00 toward the 
purchase of an airplane, as well as $19,000.00 
for improvements on her home. She explains 
the airplane purchase as an investment of her 
modest savings from assets awarded to her at 
the end of her prior marriage. The enterprise 
in which she invested has proven worthless, 
and recovery of her funds through litigation 
is now contingent at best. Meanwhile, the 
extreme economic disparity between these 
parties remains. 
Mr. Foxley argues that Ms. Foxleyfs 
expenditure of $19,000.00 to repair her home 
belies her claim that she lacked assets to do 
so. Even if we assume that the fact of this 
alleged expenditure could not, with diligence, 
have been discovered in time for trial, it is 
not grounds for retrying the case. The 
$19,000.00 figure reported by Ms. Foxley to 
her mortgagee included a substantial amount 
representing value of labor she performed, and 
it remains entirely plausible that she may, 
despite her efforts, lack the money necessary 
to pay for needed materials and completed 
repairs exceeding her abilities. Moreover, 
the $19,000.00 of home repairs does not 
necessarily indicate that she and the children 
have additional assets or no additional needs, 
a circumstance which seems improbable, 
considering the low level of support 
Mr. Foxley has provided over the years. 
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The Court of Appeals includes in its opinion statement of 
facts as to the wife!s expenditures that the husband has alleged as 
perjury and new evidence. 
The husband at the trial level moved the court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing so that he could refute the wife's proffer that 
the Court of Appeals now accepts as proven facts. Instead, the 
trial court dismissed the husband's motion for evidentiary hearing 
and motion for new trial. The husband would argue that the wife's 
argument for an increase in alimony centers around her 
unsubstantiated needs in light of this proffer of evidence. The 
husband urges this court to grant his writ so that his claims can 
be argued in an evidentiary forum with his right to confront and 
cross-examine the wife. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in domestic matters has been granted 
considerable latitude in exercising its discretion and equitable 
powers to fashion remedies to provide for alimony and the 
maintenance and support of the children and parties under §30-3-5, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) and the decisions of this 
court. The court has continuing jurisdiction under §30-3-5, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended) to make subsequent orders, as 
necessary, in keeping with public policy to protect the interest of 
the parties and children and to reduce the social and economic 
costs to the state as a result of divorce. 
18 
This court has ruled that to avoid challenge in awarding 
alimony, the trial court must consider three factors: 
1. The financial condition and needs of the spouse 
claiming support; 
2. Ability of that spouse to provide a sufficient 
income for herself; 
3. Ability of the responding spouse to pay. 
Jones, (supra). 
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion erred in not reversing the 
trial court's judgments of alimony because the trial court failed 
to show a clear rationale for the level of alimony consistent with 
the criteria of Ruhsam, (supra). 
The Rules of Evidence and evidentiary foundation should be 
required in all contested matters where a Child Support Worksheet 
is submitted. Because the wife did not properly lay a foundation 
and did not introduce evidence to support the amounts used in the 
Worksheet, the award of child support should be reversed. 
The Appellate court erred in not reversing in total the award 
of attorney's fees and granting the husband a new trial or an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this *ffi7 day 
Attorney for Defendant-Petitioner 
of December, 1990 
Greg S.^Ericksen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 1990, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to: 
Robert W. Hughes 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is 
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district court herein be, and the same is, affirmed. We 
therefore reverse the award of attorney fees and costs and 
remand for a determination of their amount. 
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Judges, concur. 
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TRIAL COURT: 
Salt Lake County Third District Court Case No. D82-1591 
I ^  C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo ~ 
Deanna Foxley, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William M. Foxley, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
\.-«n w*-?i i*C"^!S 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890493-CA 
F I L E D 
October 12, 1990 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: Greg S. Ericksen, Bountiful, Attorney for Appellant 
Robert W. Hughes, Salt Lake City, Attorney for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Newey.1 
NEWEY, Judge: 
Defendant William Foxley appeals from the modification of 
the decree divorcing him from plaintiff Deanna Foxley. We 
affirm. 
The Foxleys were married in October, 1976, when Mr. Foxley 
was a graduate student and Ms. Foxley an undergraduate 
student. They separated in April 1982 and were divorced in 
August 1983, after Mr. Foxley had just graduated from medical 
school in June 1983. Mr. Foxley has since completed residency 
and developed a professional practice specializing in 
obstetrics and gynecology. In June 1984, Ms. Foxley received a 
bachelor's degree in sociology and has since continued her 
education. 
During the marriage, three children were born to the 
Foxleys, and Mr. Foxley adopted a daughter from Ms. Foxley's 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1990). 
prior marriage. This*daughter has reached the age of majority 
since the decree was entered in 1983. The decree awarded Ms. 
Foxley monthly child support of $150 per child and alimony of 
$10 per month, based in part on Mr. Foxley*s meager income 
during medical school. 
The decree was not formally modified until July 1989, when 
the district court increased alimony to $1,350 per month and 
child support to $546 per month per child. Mr. Foxley has 
appealed from that modification. 
Substantial Change of Circumstances 
The alimony award of the initial decree appears to have 
been based on Mr. Foxley's background as a medical student and 
the prospect of an increase in his income following graduation 
from medical school: 
[Ms. Foxley] is awarded an interest in 
[Mr. Foxley's] medical degree, and is 
awarded the sum of $10.00 per month as 
alimony, and . . . at such time as there 
has been a material change in 
circumstances of the parties, the issues 
of child support and/or alimony may be 
reviewed. 
Clearly, the change in Mr. Foxley*s income from the negligible 
earnings of an unemployed student to his earnings in recent 
years well in excess of $100,000 per year is a substantial 
change of circumstances justifying a modification of the 1983 
decree. See Navlor v. Navlor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985); 
Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Foxley argues, however, that the premise for the trial 
court's modification was not the stated substantial change in 
circumstances, but rather in reality a revision of the original 
decree to include equitable restitution, which was not awarded 
in the original decree. Decisional law since the 1983 decree 
has held that a medical degree is not marital property, but 
instead has permitted equitable restitution to take into 
account a spouse's academic attainments in which the other 
spouse has assisted. See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (1988). 
However, the trial court in this case expressly declined to 
base this modification on the equitable restitution doctrine, 
and noted instead that a substantial change in circumstances 
supported the modification. From the court's comments at the 
modification hearing,-equitable restitution was apparently-
considered, but the trial court did not rest its decision on 
equitable restitution. The trial court may appropriately make 
its award based on a substantial change of circumstances with 
supporting findings, instead of choosing to base its decision 
on equitable restitution. 
Amounts of Alimony and Child Support 
If the trial court's findings and conclusions2 show that 
the court considered the material factors,3 we accord 
considerable discretion to the trial court in determining the 
amounts of alimony and child support.4 In this case, the trial 
court found Mr. Foxley's income to be in the range between 
$120,000 and $224,000.5 The court also found that Ms. Foxley 
and the children had experienced some serious hardships and had 
been on public assistance, even though Ms. Foxley had done "an 
admirable job" in performing her responsibilities. In light of 
these findings, the increases in alimony and child support are 
far from abuses of the trial court's discretion. 
2. Adequate findings and conclusions are required, see Acton 
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987); Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 
P.2d 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3. Regarding alimony, see Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 
(Utah 1985). Regarding child support, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7(2)(1987); £££ also Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 
~ 393, 394 (Utah 1985). 
4. Paffel v, Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986) (alimony); 
Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah App. 1989) (child 
support) . 
5. Mr. Foxley asserts that the evidence is inadequate to 
support the finding on the amount of his income. However, in 
thus attacking the finding, Mr. Foxley has the burden to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate from it that the finding is clearly erroneous. 
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). He has failed to do so, and the 
finding therefore stands. 
We note that the requirement of marshalling the evidence 
is especially appropriate in this case, since Mr. Foxley 
complains about the lack of evidence under his control and 
concerning a fact that he is in the best position to know. 
Post-Trial Motions 
With little authority or analysis, Mr. Foxley argues that 
the trial court erred.in denying his motions for a directed 
verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Those 
motions clearly have no place in this case. A verdict is the 
decision of a jury,6 and in this case, there was no jury. 
Mr. Foxley also moved for a new trial, pointing to 
evidence unearthed after trial concerning Ms. Foxley1s assets. 
Ms. Foxley is said to have expended $4,500 toward the purchase 
of an airplane, as well as $19,000 for improvements on her 
home. She explains the airplane purchase as an investment of-
her modest savings from assets awarded to her at the end of-her 
prior marriage. The enterprise in which she invested has 
proven worthless, and recovery of her funds through litigation 
is now contingent at best. Meanwhile, the extreme economic 
disparity between these parties remains. 
Mr. Foxley argues that Ms. Foxley*s expenditure of $19,000 
to repair her home belies her claim that she lacked assets to 
do so. Even if we assume that the fact of this alleged 
expenditure could not, with diligence, have been discovered in 
time for trial, it is not grounds for retrying the case. The 
$19,000 figure reported by Ms. Foxley to her mortgagee included 
a substantial amount representing value of labor she performed, 
and it remains entirely plausible that she may, despite her 
efforts, lack the money necessary to pay for needed materials 
and completed repairs exceeding her abilities. Moreover, the 
$19,000 of home repairs does not necessarily indicate that she 
and the children have additional assets or no additional needs, 
a circumstance which seems improbable, considering the low 
level of support Mr. Foxley has provided over the years. 
For newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, the 
evidence must have a probative weight sufficient to have a 
probable effect on the result. Greoerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 
369, 372 (Utah 1980); £££ 9lsp Dotv v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 
P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982). The evidence Mr. Foxley proffers 
does not have that degree of probative value, and the trial 
court thus did not abuse its discretion7 in denying his motion 
for a new trial. 
6. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (5th ed. 1979). 
7. S££ Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1983) 
(-trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny a motion for 
a new trial"); Chournos v. D'Aanillo. 642 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 
1982). 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
Mr. Foxley does-not challenge Ms. Foxley \s*need&£o£iLafe 
entitlement to an award of attorney'fees and costs?^btitvrather^ 
he questions the evidentiary basis establishing >-the 
reasonableness of the amount awarded. Ms. Foxley proffered 
evidence of the amount of her attorney fees over Mr. Foxley1s 
objection, and she later filed an unsworn statement concerning 
them. There is, however, no admissible evidence in the record 
to substantiate the reasonableness of amount awarded. Since 
Mr. Foxley objected to the lack of evidence, and thereby placed 
in issue the basis for determining fact of reasonableness, an 
evidentiary basis for the amount awarded needs to be 
established. We therefore reverse the award of attorney fees 
and costs and remand for a determination of their amount. 
The modification of the parties' divorce decree is 
affirmed in all other respects.9 
M* //fiLiiA 
Robert L. Newey, wudge 
Norman H. Jackson,kludge 
8. Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Asper v. Asper, 752 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
9. There is no merit to the claim that the trial judge should 
have been disqualified for bias. See State v. Gardner, 789 
P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989) (recusal required only where 
substantial rights of the party are shown to be affected); s&& 
also Qnyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (timely objection required to raise question of 
judicial bias); S3& generally Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & 
Loan, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988). 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF^APPEALS 
00O00-
DEC 31390 
Deanna Foxley, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William M. Foxley, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890493-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Garff, and Newey. 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Appellee's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed October 26, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellee's Petition for Rehearing 
is denied. 
Dated this • » day of November, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
Noonan, Clerk 'Mary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of December, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to each of 
the following: 
Robert W. Hughes 
Attorney for Appellee 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Greg S. Ericksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
1065 So. 500 West 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1990. 
Deputy Clerk , ^ 
30-3-1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Section 
30-3-10.2. Joint legal custody order — Fac-
tors for court determination — 
Public assistance 
30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order. 
30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of or-
der. 
30-3-10.5. Payments of support, mainte-
nance, and alimony. 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support or-
der — Judgment 
30-3-11. Repealed. 
30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose. 
30-3-11.2. Appointment of counsel for child. 
30-3-12. Courts to exercise family counsel-
ing powers. 
30-3-13. Repealed. 
30-3-13.1. Establishment of family court di-
vision of district court. 
30-3-14. Repealed 
30-3-14.1. Designation of judges — Terms 
30-3-15. Repealed. 
30-3-15.1. Appointment of domestic rela-
tions counselors, family court 
commissioner, and assistants 
and clerks 
30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Grounds. 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided by law 
for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant on the grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases 
where the plaintiff or defendant has been an actual and bona fide resident of 
this state and of the county where the action is brought, or if members of the 
armed forces of the United States who are not legal residents of this state, 
where the plaintiff has been stationed in this state under military orders, for 
three months next prior to the commencement of the action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the defendant at the time of marriage; 
(b) adultery committed by the defendant subsequent to marriage; 
(c) willful desertion of the plaintiff by the defendant for more than 6ne 
year; 
(d) willful neglect of the defendant to provide for the plaintiff the com-
mon necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the defendant; 
(f) conviction of the defendant for a felony; 
(g) cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant to the extent of 
causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the plaintiff; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of 
separate maintenance of any state for three consecutive years without 
cohabitation. m 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)0*) does not affect the 
liability of either party under any provision for separate maintenance previ-
ously granted. 
Section 
30-3-15.2 Domestic relations counselors — 
Powers. 
30-3-15.3. Commissioners — Powers. 
30-3-15.4. Salaries and expenses. 
30-3-16. Repealed. 
30-3-16.1. Jurisdiction of family court divi-
sion — Powers. 
30-3-16.2. Petition for conciliation. 
30-3-16.3. Contents of petition. 
30-3-16.4. Procedure upon filing of petition. 
30-3-16.5. Fees. 
30-3-16.6. Information not available to pub-
lic. 
30-3-16.7. Effect of petition — Pendency of 
action. 
30-3-17. Power and jurisdiction of judge. 
30-3-17.1. Proceedings deemed confidential 
— Written evaluation by coun-
selor. 
30-3-18. Waiting period for hearing after 
filing for divorce — Use of coun-
seling service not to be con-
strued as condonation. 
30-3-19 to 30-3-22. Repealed 
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DIVORCE 30^3-5 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of ^ parties and children — Court to have con-
turning jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —• 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the emplojnnent or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-. 
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. added Subsection (2); designated two undesig-
1909, ch. 109, S 4; C.L- 1917, § 3000; R.S. nated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4); 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; inserted "In determining" and "the court" in 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsec-
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1. tions (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); di-
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- vided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substi-
ment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1); tuting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 
978 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 
1987). 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebutta-
ble guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court 
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall re-
quire each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines 
before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may 
be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess 
all arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; and 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in 
but not limited to:"; rewrote Subsection (3)(e), 
which had read, "the need of the obligee"; sub-
stituted "ages" for "age" in Subsection (3)(f); 
redesignated former Subsection (3) as Subsec-
tion (4); deleted former Subsection (4), provid-
ing for the establishment and use of a uniform 
statewide assessment formula; and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
support of spouse and children. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch. 
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, divided former 
Subsection (2) into present Subsections (2) and 
(3) by substituting the language beginning "re-
quire each party" at the end of Subsection (2) 
and the introductory language in Subsection 
(3) for "consider all relevant factors including 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE RuIe.;8CH 
Rule 706. Court-appointed experts. 
(a) Appointment The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any 
party enter an order to show 'cause why expert witnesses should not be ap-
pointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may 
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint 
expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed 
by the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be in-
formed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with 
the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to 
participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if 
any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to testify 
by the court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each 
party, including a party calling him as a witness. 
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reason-
able compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation 
thus fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal 
cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings the compensation 
shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court 
directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs. 
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court 
may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the 
expert witness. 
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the 
parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection. 
judge has inherent authority to call a witness 
Merchants Bank v Goodfeilow, 44 Utah 349, 
140 P 759 (1914) 
Cross-References. — Blood tests in actions 
to determine parentage, appointment of ex-
perts by court, ^ 78-25-18 to 78-25-23, 
78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10 
Cnminal proceedings, court appointment of 
expert witnesses, ^ 77-35-15 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of independent expert to re-
fuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 
A L.R.4th 680 
ARTICLE VIIL 
HEARSAY. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim Rules 59-61 of the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953), on which 
the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) were pat-
terned, provided for the appointment, compen-
sation and handling of appointed expert wit-
ness testimony These rules were not adopted 
in the state of Utah The reason for the rejec-
tion is unknown However, the Utah Supreme 
Court has previously indicated that a trial 
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Rule 801 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual 
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a 
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection 
ta) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971* 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices 
and machines, e.g., radar The definition of 
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially 
the same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from 
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior 
statements as substantive evidence if (1) incon-
sistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and 
does not require the prior statement to have 
been given under oath or subject to perjury. 
The former Utah rules admitted such state-
ments as an exception to the hearsay rule. See 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with 
respect to confrontation problems under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally pro-
mulgated by the United States Supreme Court 
with the addition of the language "or the wit-
ness denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior 
Utah rule and the actual effect on most juries. 
Subdivision <d)(l*<B) is in substance the 
same as Rule 63< 1 •. Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its 
interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 
310 P.2d 366 (1957). 
Subdivision (d)(l><C) comports with prior 
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123, 
388 P.2d 797 «1964). State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 
2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969). 
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was 
contained in Rules 63*6) and (7), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B) 
and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to 
the hearsay rule. 
Rule 63(9>, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), 
was of similar substance and scope to subdivi-
sion (d)(2)(D». except that Rule 63(9) required 
that the declarant be unavailable before such 
admissions are received. Adoptive and vicari-
ous admissions have been recognized as admis-
sible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v. 
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
Statements by a co-conspirator of a party 
made during the course and in furtherance of 
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ment of the victim's testimony was not hear-
say State v Hutchison, 655 P 2d 635 (Utah 
1982) 
prior inconsistent statement properly ex-
cluded See State v Heaps, 711 P 2d 257 (Utah 
1985) 
Cited in Zion's First Nat'l Bank v 
Fennemore 655 P2d 1111 (Utah 1982) State 
v Jones, 656 P2d 1012 (Utah 1982), State v 
Velasquez, 672 P2d 1254 (Utah 1983), In re 
J L K , 728 P2d 988 (Utah 1986); State • 
Walker, 743 P 2d 191 (Utah 1987); State ex rei. 
State Dep't of Social Servs v Woods, 744 P 2d 
315 (Utah Ct App 1987), Tripp v Vaughn, 
747 P 2d 1051 (Utah Ct App 1987), State v 
Barber, 747 P 2d 436 (Utah Ct App 1987), 
Miller v Archer, 749 P 2d 1274 (Utah Ct App 
1988), State v Thomas, 111 Utah Adv Rep 24 
(1989) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Bngham Young Law Review. — The 
Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence An 
Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent 
Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B Y U 
L Rev 231 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com-
ment Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Consti 
tutional Implications 15 J Contemp L 81 
•1989) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence 
§ 493 et seq 
C.J.S. — 31A C J S Evidence § 192 et seq 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of impeached wit-
ness' prior consistent statement—modern state 
criminal cases, 58 A L R 4th 1014 
Key Numbers. — Evidence «» 314 et seq 
Rule 802, Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
(1974) and is the same as the first paragraph 
of Rule 63 Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
Cross-References. — Affidavits taking 
and certification of ^ 78 26 5 et seq 
Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-
cedent as prima facie evidence, ^ 78 25-8 
Judgment entry of, Rule 58A, U R C P 
Judgment roll in criminal case contents and 
filing, * 77-35-22 
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing, 
^ 30-1-6, 30-1-12 
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3, Rule 
44, U R C P 
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general 
Chemical breath analysis 
Purpose 
In general. 
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the 
ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two 
basic reasons (1) the person who purports to 
know the facts is not stating them under oath, 
(2) that person is not present for cross-exami-
nation State v Sibert 6 Utah 2d 198 310 P 2d 
388 (1957) 
Chemical breath analysis. 
Section 41-6-44 3, governing the admission 
of chemical breath analysis, is a valid statu-
tory exception to the hearsay rule Layton City 
v Bennett, 741 P 2d 965 (Utah Ct App 1987), 
cert denied, 765 P2d 1277 (Utah 1988) 
Purpose. 
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose 
the exclusion of evidence not subject to cross-
examination concerning the truthfulness of the 
matters asserted State v Long, 721 P 2d 483 
(Utah 1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law — Com 
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
tutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 
11989) 
81 
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Rule 803- Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant im-
material. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining 
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event 
or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A 
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensa-
tion, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the 
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and de-
scribing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, 
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a 
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insuffi-
cient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to 
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in 
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the mem-
orandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be re-
ceived as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compi-
lation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances 
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as 
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the pro-
visions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the 
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in 
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccur-
rence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made 
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. .* 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) 
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the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to 
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceed-
ings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings re-
sulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any 
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof 
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a 
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoc-
currence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, 
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accor-
dance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose 
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, mar-
riages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or 
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in 
a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of 
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or 
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, pub-
lic official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a reli-
gious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting 
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family 
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on 
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or 
tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The 
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in prop-
erty, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its 
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been 
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable 
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A 
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an 
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the 
document, unless dealings with the property since the document was 
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the pur-
port of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in 
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications, ^larket quotations, 
tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally 
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupa-
tions. 
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(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an 
expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness 
or by otker expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputa-
tion among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or 
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, 
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or 
family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Repu-
tation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of 
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events 
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which 
located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character 
among his associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, 
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo 
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain 
the judgment, bat not including, when offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments 
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may 
be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general 
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be 
provable by evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that <A» the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known 
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 63(4)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971». State 
the federal rule, verbatim. Subdivision (1) is v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 <Utah 1978 >. 
comparable to Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evi- Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule 
dence (1971). 63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971». 
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12), 
590 
Rule 803 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant im-
material. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining 
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event 
or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A 
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensa-
tion, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the 
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and de-
scribing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, 
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a 
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insuffi-
cient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to 
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in 
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the mem-
orandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be re-
ceived as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compi-
lation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances 
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as 
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the pro-
visions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the 
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in 
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccur-
rence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made 
and preserved, unless the sources qf information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) 
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the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to 
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceed-
ings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings re-
sulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any 
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof 
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a 
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoc-
currence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, 
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accor-
dance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose 
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, mar-
riages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or 
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in 
a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of 
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a.marriage or 
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, pub-
lic official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a reli-
gious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting 
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family 
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on 
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or 
tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The 
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in prop-
erty, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its 
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been 
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable 
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A 
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an 
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the 
document, unless dealings with the property since the document was 
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the pur-
port of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in 
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, 
tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally 
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupa-
tions. 
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(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an 
expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness 
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputa-
tion among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or 
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, 
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or 
family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Repu-
tation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of 
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events 
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which 
located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character 
among his associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, 
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty <but not upon a plea of nolo 
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain 
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments 
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may 
be shown but does not affect admissibility 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general 
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be 
provable by evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts: and (C) the general 
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known 
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim. Subdivision (1) is 
comparable to Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evi-
dence (1971). 
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 
63(4)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State 
v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978). 
Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule 
63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12), 
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Rule 806. Attacking and supporting credibility of declar-
ant. 
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), 
(D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may 
be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would 
be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evi-
dence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent 
with his hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may 
have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against 
whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, 
the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-exami-
nation. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is of Evidence (1971), contained a comparable 
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 65, Utah Rules provision. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 190. 
^ 254, 267 et seq. Key Numbers. — Evidence «=» 155. 
ARTICLE IX. 
AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION. 
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification. 
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identifica-
tion as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient 
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, 
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming 
with the requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter 
is what it is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the 
genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for pur-
poses of the litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier 
of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenti-
cated. 
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in 
conjunction with circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard first-
hand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by 
opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances 
connecting it with the alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conservations, by evidence 
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone 
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company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, 
circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering 
to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a 
place of business and the conversation related to business reasonably 
transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by 
law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or 
a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any 
form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a docu-
ment or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create 
no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if 
authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more 
at the time it is offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used 
to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an 
accurate result 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authenti-
cation or identification provided by court rule or statute of this state. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision 
(b)(2) is in accord with State v Freshwater 30 
Utah 442, 85 Pac 447 (1906) Subdivision 
(b)(8) is comparable with Rule 67 Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1971), except that the former rule 
imposed a 30-year requirement Subdivision 
(b)(10) is an adaptation of subdivision (10) m 
the comparable federal rules to conform to 
state practice 
Cross-References. — Official record, au-
thentication of copy, Rule 44(a), U R C P 
Wntmgs, manner of proof, ^ 78-25-9 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Nonexpert opinion on handwriting 
Photographs 
Public records or reports 
Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. 
Writing may be proved by evidence of a wit-
ness who has seen the person write, even if the 
witness has seen him write only once and then 
only his name The proof m such case may be 
very light, but the jury will be permitted to 
weigh it State v Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 
P 447 (1906) (referred to m Committee Note) 
Photographs. 
In general, if a competent witness with per-
sonal knowledge of the facts represented by a 
photograph testifies that the photograph accu-
rately reflects those facts, it is admissible, and 
any minor discrepancies in the testimony 
which go only to the details of the time and 
place the picture was taken are not material to 
the purpose for which the evidence is intro-
duced and they do not undermine the adequacy 
of the foundation for admissibility of the photo-
graphs State v Purcell, 711 P2d 243 (Utah 
1985) 
Public records or reports. 
No Utah statute recognizes the certifying 
signature of a notary public, without more, as 
a proper means of authenticating an official 
document as evidence State v Lamone, 610 
P.2d 342 (Utah 1980) 
Copies of county court records, certified by a 
duly authorized notary public who had no cus-
tody of the documents, official or unofficial, 
and who was not a deputy of the court clerk 
the court clerk being the official custodian of 
the documents, did not constitute adequate au-
thentication State v Lamone, 610 P 2d 342 
(Utah 1980). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence computing equipment, 71 A.L*R.3d 232. 
§ 849 et seq. Construction and effect of § 1-202 of the 
C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 733 et seq.; Uniform Commercial Code dealing with docu-
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 743 et seq. . ments which are prima facie evidence of their 
AJLR. — Proof of authorship or identity of o w n authenticity and genuineness, 72 
sender of telegram as prerequisite of its admis- A.L.R.3d 1243. 
sion in evidence, 5 A.L.R.3d 1018. K e * Numbers. - Evidence *= 366 et seq. 
Public records kept or stored on electronic 
Rule 902. Self-authentication. 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility 
is not required with respect to the following: 
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a 
seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, district, 
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama 
Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political 
subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature pur-
porting to be an attestation or execution. 
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document pur-
porting to bear the signature in his official capacity of an officer or em-
ployee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a 
public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or 
political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that 
the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine. 
(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be exe-
cuted or attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by the 
laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and accom-
panied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and 
official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any 
foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official 
position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certifi-
cates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the 
execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary 
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular 
agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the 
foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable 
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity 
and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, 
order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certi-
fication or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or 
without final certification. 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or 
report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded 
or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data 
compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other 
person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with 
Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the 
United States or of this state. 
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications 
purporting to be issued by public authority. 
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(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be 
newspapers or periodicals. 
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or la-
bels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicat-
ing ownership, control, or origin. 
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certifi-
cate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a 
notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. 
(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper, 
signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent pro-
vided by general commercial law. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authenti-
cation or identification provided by court rule, statute, or as provided in 
the constitution of this state. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision This subdivision I sic] does not supersede 
(1) is comparable to Rule 68, Utah Rules of Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
Evidence (1971). defines the form of certification. 
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 68(3), Cross-References. — Proof of official 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). record, Rule 44, U.R.C.P. 
Subdivision (10) is Rule 902(10), Uniform 
Rules of Evidence (1974). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Foreign public documents. into evidence to establish that one charged 
Copies of Colorado court records, certified by with unlawful possession of dangerous weapon 
notary public who had no custody, official or was on parole for felony. State v. Lamorie, 610 
unofficial, of the documents, were lacking suf- p.2d 342 (Utah 1980) 
ficient authentication to permit their receipt 
Rule 903. Subscribing witness' testimony unnecessary. 
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a 
writing unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the 
validity of the writing. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Annotated (1953), are unchanged by this rule, 
the federal rule, verbatim. Statutory provi- Cross-References. — Proof of writing, 
sions concerning authentication of documents, § 78-25-9 et seq. 
such as, e.g., Title 78 Chapter 25, Utah Code 
ARTICLE X. 
CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, 
AND PHOTOGRAPHS. 
Rule 1001. Definitions. 
For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable: 
(1) Writings and recordings. '"Writings" and "recordings" consist of 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. 
Photographs. 
Public records or reports. 
Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. 
Writing may be proved by evidence of a wit-
ness who has seen the person write, even if the 
witness has seen him write only once and then 
only his name. The proof in such case may be 
very light, but the jury will be permitted to 
weigh it. State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 
P. 447 (1906) (referred to in Committee Note). 
Photographs. 
In general, if a competent witness with per-
sonal knowledge of the facts represented by a 
photograph testifies that the photograph accu-
rately reflects those facts, it is admissible, and 
any minor discrepancies in the testimony 
which go only to the details of the time and 
place the picture was taken are not material to 
the purpose for which the evidence is intro-
duced and they do not undermine the adequacy 
of the foundation for admissibility of the photo-
graphs. State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 
1985). 
Public records or reports. 
No Utah statute recognizes the certifying 
signature of a notary public, without more, as 
a proper means of authenticating an official 
document as evidence. State v. Lamorie, 610 
P.2d 342 (Utah 1980). 
Copies of county court records, certified by a 
duly authorized notary public who had no cus-
tody of the documents, official or unofficial, 
and who was not a deputy of the court clerk, 
the court clerk being the official custodian of 
the documents, did not constitute adequate au-
thentication. State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 
(Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 849 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 733 et seq.; 
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 743 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proof of authorship or identity of 
sender of telegram as prerequisite of its admis-
sion in evidence, 5 A.L.R.3d 1018. 
Public records kept or stored on electronic 
computing equipment, 71 A.L.R.3d 232. 
Construction and effect of § 1-202 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code dealing with docu-
ments which are prima facie evidence of their 
own authenticity and genuineness, 72 
A.L.R.3d 1243. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence •=» 366 et seq. 
Rule 902. Self-authentication. 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility 
is not required with respect to the following: 
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a 
seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, district, 
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama 
Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political 
subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature pur-
porting to be an attestation or execution. 
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document pur-
porting to bear the signature in his official capacity of an officer or em-
ployee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a 
public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or 
political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that 
the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine. 
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(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be exe-
cuted or attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by the 
laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and accom-
panied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and 
official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any 
foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official 
position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certifi-
cates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the 
execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary 
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular 
agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the 
foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable 
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity 
and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, 
order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certi-
fication or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or 
without final certification. 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or 
report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded 
or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data 
compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other 
person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with 
Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the 
United States or of this state. 
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications 
purporting to be issued by public authority. 
(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be 
newspapers or periodicals. 
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or la-
bels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicat-
ing ownership, control, or origin. 
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certifi-
cate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a 
notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. 
(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper, 
signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent pro-
vided by general commercial law. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authenti-
cation or identification provided by court rule, statute, or as provided in 
the constitution of this state. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision This subdivision [sic] does not supersede 
(1) is comparable to Rule 68, Utah Rules of Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
Evidence (1971). defines the form of certification. 
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule 68(3), Cross-References. — Proof of official 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
 r e c o r d R u l e u u.R.C.P. 
Subdivision (10) is Rule 902(10), Uniform 
Rules of Evidence (1974). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
vs. 
WILLIAM FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. D 82 1591 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
* * * 
This cause came on to be heard before the 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges of the said 
Court, on the 7th day of March, 1989, when and where the 
following proceedings were had. 
* * * 
A ? P L A R A IJ C E S 
For the Plaintiff; 
For the Defendant; 
MR. ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney at Law 
50 Uest Third South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MR. GREG S. ERICKSEN 
Attorney at Law 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Utah 34010 
HAL li. WALTON 
Registered Professional Reporter 
1
 MR. KRICKSEK: Nothing further from this witness, 
2 your Honor. 
3
 TH2 COURT: You may ^ step clownf Dr. Foxley. 
4
 MR. ERICXSiW* The only final thing I have so far 
5 as I know, we've only had one submission of attorney's fees 
6
 by Mr. Dyer. I would make a proffer, if your Eonor wishes, 
7 and be called to the witness stand to testify as to my own 
8 and some of those attorney's fees and what went on in 
9 contradiction and rebuttal to his testimony. 
10 THJL, COURT; Phil Dyer? 
11 III;. HUGIL-S: He was the first witness. 
12 THL COURT: Yeah. 
13 ilR. HUGILuS; And in the interest of time, first, 
14 i would object because he cross-examined Mr. Dyer as to 
15 those. But I don't object to a proffer. I also have a 
16 schedule of support based upon the guidelines. I didn't 
1? introduce it, but it's something that I had provided, however 
1* in December, to Mr. Ericksen. I would ask to have that 
19 admitted along with all of the other exhibits. 
20 2>iR. ERICKSEN: Object at this point. He closed his 
21 case. 
22 MR. HUGHES: Probably true. 
23 THil COURT: V«ell, I suppose under the rules, he 
24 
can file those guideline worksheets any time you want to, 
25 so go ahead. 
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MR. KUGHLS: I was going .to say just file it. 
THH COURT: Yeah. Doesn't really make that much 
difference. Okay. What do you want to do about attorney's 
fees with Dyer? 
IIR. ERICKSEN: Just aoing to make a proffer that 
Iir. Dyer ran up an extraordinary amount of attorney's fees. 
And part of those attorney's fees were incurred because of 
the procedural mistakes by prior counsel. Part of the 
attorney's fees were made trying to get me disqualified as 
the attorney, which I donft think had any basis and were 
frivolous. They should never have,been brought. I would 
like the Court to consider that in rebuttal to his testimony< 
TII^  COURT; Ckay. Too much has been spent on 
the attorney's fees and not enough been spent on the kids. 
That's one of the problems, so where do we go from here? 
IAR. ITUGHiiS: Two things, your Honor. Ilr. Lricksen 
or lir. Dyer was cross-examined on that issue. And if the 
Court would like, that's on Page 7 and 3 of the transcript. 
Also, there were my attorney's fees, and I would like to 
put that in the record. 
TH* COURT: You may. 
liR. KUGIIES: Just as a matter of proffer. Do you 
want me sworn in? 
MR. jJKICKSLN: I object to that. 
MR. HUGILL.3. Why would you object? 
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Robert W. Hughes (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 534-1074 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TOIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY 
Plaintiff 
vs, 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY > 
Defendant. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY) 
Civil No. 
AVAILABLE INCOME P l a i n t i f f 
Gross Monthly Income 1a 791.QQ 
P r e - E x i s t i n g Alimony or 
C h i l d Support Orders You 
Have Paid 2a Q 
Adjusted Gross Income 3a 791.00 
(1a-2a=3a,1b-2b=3b,3a+3b=3c) 
Proportionate Share of 
Combined Income 4a 10 % 
( 3 a - 3 c = 4 a , 3 b - 3 c - 4 b ) 
Defendant Combined 
1b6969.25 
2b 
-fl. 
3b 6969,25 3c 7760.25 
4b 9Q % 
CHILD SUPPORT NEED 
Age Group 
Number of Children 
per Age Group 
(5a+5b+5c=5d) 
Schedule Amount per 
Chi Id 6a 504 
0-6 
5a 1 
7-15 16-18 
5b_2_ 5c Q 5d 
6c Q „ . 6b 607
 — 
(use the combined adjusted gross income from JC ana the 
schedule appropriate to the total number of children in 5d) 
Total Amount 7a 504 7b1214 7c Q 7d1718 
(5ax6a=7a, 5bx6b=7b, 5cx6c=/c, /a+7b+/c=7d) 
Work-Related Child Care Costs 
Health and Dental Insurance Premiums for Children 
Total Support Need 
(7d+8+9=10) 
8_ 
9 
JL 
10 1718 
11a 171 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
Share of Obligation 
(4ax10=11a, 4bx10=11b) 
Credit for Actual Payments in 8 and 9 1 2 a 0 
11b 1547 
12b 0 
Parent's Total Child Support Obligation 13a 171 
(11a-12a=13a, 11b-12b=13b) 
13b 1547 
The extended visitation amount applies only to the non-custodial 
parent and to those months in which the order specifies that the 
child spend at least 25 of 30 consecutive days with that parent. 
Amount Paid During Extended Visitation 14a 128.25 14b 1160-25 
(13ax.75=14a, 13bx.75=14b) 
n o \ ^ as^ 
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WILLIAM FOXL^Y, 
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Defendant. 
Case No. D 82 1591 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
* * * 
This cause came on to be heard before the 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. 110FFAT, one of the Judges of the said 
Court, on the 7th day of March, 1989, when and where the 
following proceedings were had. 
* * * 
A P P L A F. A II C h S 
For the Plaintiff; 
For the Defendant; 
MR. ROBERT W. EUGHiiS 
Attorney at Law 
50 West Third South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I1R. GRLG S. iIRICKSr.il 
Attorney at Law 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Utah 34010 
HAL L. WALTON 
registered Professional Reporter 
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 {
 H£. KUGKLS: I was going .to say just file it. 
2
 I TH£ COURT: Yeah. Doesn't really make that much 
* difference. Okay. What do you want to do about attorney's^ 
* fees with Dyer? 
5 I1R. ERICKSJSN: Just aoing to make a proffer that 
* I\X. Dyer ran up an extraordinary amount of attorney's fees. 
7 And part of those attorney's fees were incurred because of 
8 the procedural mistakes by prior counsel. Part of the 
9 attorney's fees were made trying to get me disqualified as 
10. the attorney, which I don't think had any basis and were 
11 frivolous. They should never have been brought. I would 
12 like the Court to consider that in rebuttal to his testimony• 
13 TIIL COUivT; Ckay. Too much has been spent on 
'* the attorney's fees and not enough been spent on the kids. 
15 That's one of the problems, so where do we go from here? 
16 13. TTUGHLiS: Two things, your Honor* Ilr. Lricksen 
1? or Ilr. Dyer was cross-examined on that issue. And if the 
18 Court would like, that's on Page 7 and 3 of the transcript. 
19 Also, there were ray attorney's fees, and I would like to 
20 put that in the record. 
21 THu COURT; You may. 
22 jia. HUGHES: Just as a matter of proffer. Do you 
23 want me sworn in? 
24 ;.?£. JUKICKSLN: I object to that. j 
25 i££. IIUGIL-5. Why would you object? | 
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i>IK. LRICKS^N: Your .case is closed. 
KR. HUGHES: YOu and I agreed we would put on my 
^attorney's fees", in chambers this morning. That would be 
the last thing we did. I said I would do it by proffer. 
liR. ^ RICICSIiN: I said I have no objections if you 
did it during your case. 
MR. IIUGIILS; Move tq proffer my attorney's fees, 
your Honor. 
TIL- COURT; You may .go ahead. 
liR. HUGHJS: Your Honor, let me have these marked, 
if I could, please. Two docunents I would submit to the 
12 I Court, exhibits No. 16 and 17. Lxhibit No. 16 would be 
13 the monthly statements that I sent to the plaintiff for 
14 services rendered and would show an amount due presently, 
15 including payments which she has made, of $3,180. exhibit 
16 No. 17 was an affidavit that I prepared and filed with the 
17 Court for our first hearing, one of our first hearings on 
18 this matter, indicating my attorney's fees for $1,365 up 
19 until February. The Court, if it reviews this, will notice 
20 that from about 1937 up until February, it showed that 
21 Deanna Foxley had a credit and that there were no services 
22 provided during that time. The problem was that we had 
23 changed billings at that time ana those were not repre-
24 sented on the new computer bills that we entered into. For 
*5 ease of the Court, I would waive my initial attorneyfs fees 
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in this natter, the $1/900, and subnit iay attorney's fees 
would be as indicated in Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 and totall 
S3,000. I would have to include the payments as indicated 
made to me by the plaintiff. 
I would nove for the admission of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Nos. 16 and 17. 
7
 I'm: COURT: Over objection? 
8
 I'IR. ilRICKiJbN: Over objection. 
9
 I •JEL COURT; TJiil be received. 
You gentlemen want summary? 
H 11x1. ZLvECCJliN: Like a closing, yes. 
12 i'H^  COURT: We'll take a ten-uinute break so Hal 
13 can rest his fingers. Ve'll come back and listen to 
1* closing. 
15 I (Vher^won, the recess was taken.) 
THL COURT: You nay proceed. 
MR. UP.ICKSLIJ; First address child support, your 
Honor. The Uniform Child Support guidelines overview 
requires that worksheets must be completed in accordance 
20 I with instructions contained therein and submitted to the 
21 I Court with supporting financial certification. The problen 
22 I that I have got with Mr. Hughes1 offer of his schedule is 
23 number one, tht,±e was no foundation for it/ and number two, 
24 no ability to cross-examine by the defendant, number three, 
25 it was submitted after he closed his case, and number four, 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Robert W. Hughes (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lak*» rity, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1074 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, : 
Defendant. s 
: SUPPLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS 
: FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES 
: Civil No: D82-1591 
: Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Attached hereto is a copy of the attorneys1 fees 
incurred by Robert W. Hughes through the date of trial. This 
submission is to supplement the exhibit of attorneys1 fees 
submitted at trial. 
DATED this \Jg_ day of March, 1989. 
W1-FOX-SA1 
Robert W. Hughes 
Attorney at Law 
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101-2006 (801) 534-1074 
DeAnna Foxley 
735 Wall Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
BILLING DATE 03-13-89 
HD-RWH-32 
ACC'T NO. RWH87DM-816-1 
:VI0US BALANCE 
'E PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
-28-89 Conference with client(sj . 
•02-89 Preparation for hearing. 
•02-89 Preparation of Response to Motion. 
-05-89 Preparation of Response to Motion. 
•05-89 Preparation for hearing. 
•06-89 Conference with client(s). 
•06-89 Preparation for hearing. 
•06-89 Telephone conf. with opposing attorney, 
•07-89 Preparation for hearing. 
-07-89 Court appearance for hearing. 
•07-89 Conference with client(s). 
\^L FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES 
INDIV 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
TIME 
1.10 
1.00 
0.60 
2.60 
2.80 
1.20 
4.80 
0.20 
1.20 
5.40 
0.80 
21.70 
$3,180.00 
$66.00 
$60.00 
$36.00 
$156.00 
$168.00 
$72.00 
$288.00 
$12.00 
$72.00 
$324.00 
$48.00 
$1,302.00 
'E EXPENSES 
•07-89 Transcript Cost. 
'AL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES 
PAYMENT RECEIVED 
02—27—89 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
$62.25 
TOTAL 
$150.00 
AMOUNT DUE 
$62.25 
$4,544.25 
$150.00 
$4,394.25 
Prompt payment is appreciated. 
Make check payable to Robert w. Hughes. 
*** THANK YOU *** 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Ji 
I hereby certify that on this \6T day of March, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES was mailed, first-class 
postage thereon prepaid, to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 300 
East, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
Btftjihel 
GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Ot 84010 
Telephone:(801)295-6841 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA 
VS. 
WILLIAM 
FOXLEY, ) 
M. 
Plaintiff, ) 
FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S PEES 
OF ROBERT W. HUGHES 
CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
COMES NOW Greg S. Ericksen, counsel for Defendant who 
objects to Supplement to Attorney's fees of Robert W. Hughes 
based on the following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff Robert W. Hughes did not submit his 
attorney's fees during trial of this matter, and submits evidence 
of attorney's fees after the case has been^ Kejard and/a^6ed. 
DATED this /9\ day of March, 1989/ 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of March, 1989# a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection was mailed via 
first class mail, postage pre-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at 
the following address: 1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101. 
-7Mto« PltJJmi. 
MARY HAlLMAN 
* 
& • * . 
MISCrFoxley 
GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Ut 84010 
Telephone:(801)295-6841 
AU6 -7 BBS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA 
vs. 
WILLIAM 
FOXLEY, 
M. 
Plai 
FOXLEY, 
Defe 
ntiff, ) 
ndant. ) 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on 1st day of June, 1989, at 
the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the honorable Richard Moffatt, Judge 
of the above-entitled Court, sitting without jury on various 
motions by the parties including: 
-Defendant's Objection to Findings of Fact/Conclusions of 
Law, Order, entered by this court on April 19, 1989; 
-Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict; 
-Defendant's Motion for New Trial; 
-Defendant's Motion to Extend Time for Filing Affidavits 
-Defendant's Motion to Find Plaintiff in Contempt of Court 
for Perjury. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Robert W. 
Hughes, Defendant was not personally presnt but was represented 
by counsel, Greg S. Ericksen. 
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The Court having reviewed the file and the Motions, and 
having heard argument of Counsel and being advised in the 
premises, now enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
1. That Defendants Objection to portions of the Findings 
of Fact/Conclusions of Law are hereby granted in part and ordered 
to be amended in the following particulars: 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 2 
"At the time of their marriage the defendant did not own any 
real property, had no savings, had few household furnishings and 
owned a pick up truck which he sold shortly after the marriage." 
Ordered deleted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 3 
"At the time of the marriage, the plaintiff owned no real 
property, had approximately $8,900.00 in savings, owned two 
automobiles and had substantial household furnishings and 
appliances." 
Ordered deleted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 4 
"In 1977 the parties moved from Boise, Idaho, to Saltello, 
Mexico, so that the defendant could attend medical "school." 
Ordered deleted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 5 
"The defendant attended several medical schools in Mexico. 
In 1980 the parties relocated to Salt. Lake City, Utah, so that 
the defendant could attend the University of Utah Medical 
School." 
Ordered deleted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 8 
"During the marriage, the plaintiff was employed as a school 
teacher in Mexico, at a Savings and Loan, and at a grocery store. 
The defendant was also employed at various times during the 
marriage." 
Ordered deleted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 10 
"During the marriage, the parties depleted the plaintiff's 
pre-marriage savings and used the vehicles and other personal 
property which the plaintiff had acquired prior to the marriage." 
Ordered deleted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 33 
"The Court finds that at the time of the modification 
hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of 
the parties, that the plaintiff has a real and substantial need 
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial 
and significant personal hardships both during the marriage and 
since the time of the divorce." 
Ordered changed to 
The Court finds that at the time of the modification 
hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of 
the parties, that the plaintiff has a real and substantial need 
for an increase in alimony and that she.has endured substantial 
and significant hardships since the time of the divorce• 
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2. That the following additions to Findings of 
Fact/Conclusions of Law are hereby approved and incorporated into 
Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law. 
A. A finding of plaintiff's financial condition and 
income at the time of the decree. 
(1) A finding of plaintiff's expenses at the time 
of the decree at about a thousand seventy ($1,070.00). 
(2) A finding that the plaintiff is currently 
living in the same home she was living in at the time the decree 
was entered. 
(3) A finding of how much the plaintiff is 
currently earning. 
3. Defendant's Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding the 
Verdict be and hereby is denied. 
4. Defendant's Motion for New Trial be and hereby is 
denied. 
5. Defendant's Motion to Extend Time to File further 
Affidavits In Support of Defendant's Motion for New Trial based 
on newly discovered evidence be and hereby is denied. 
6. Defendant's Motion to Find Plaintiff in Contempt of 
Court for Perjury be and hereby is denied. 
7. Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Attorney's 
Fees from the order entered on April 19, 1989 be and hereby is 
denied, 
SO ORDERED. 
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r • <^ Y QirsfflJLAAAjftf, 1989. 
THU -rniibi 
APPROVED FORM: 
R o b e r t W 
Att 
/ / uresr a^./Mricksen 
Attorney for Defendant 
MISC:Foxie' 
S 
ROBERT W HUGHES (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone- {801)534-1074 
JUl, • 6 88!) 
SACTLAif^JuLriif BY
 Jjp** ^ 4 * ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
JUDGE RICHAKD H MOFFAT 
THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the 
hour of 2:00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7, 1989 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition hi Mudify a 
Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge 
of the above-entitled Court, sitting without jury. The 
Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W Hughes and 
the Defendant, William N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S. 
Ericksen. 
The Court having heard testimony and received evidence, 
argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises is now prepared to enter its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8, 
1 
1976. At the time of the marriage, the Plaintiff was an 
undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at 
Boise State University. 
2. The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree 
of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August 
23, 1983 to become final three months from the time of entry. 
3. At the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff was 
unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and 
had an income, not including amounts received from student loans, 
of approximately $50.00 per month. 
4. That at the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff had 
expenses of $1,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of 
$895.00 per month. 
5. The Defendant graduated from the University of Utah 
Medical School in June of 1983. 
6. During the parties marriage the parties had four minor 
children to wit: Christine, born September 19, 1970. (Christine 
was the daughter of the Plaintiff by a prior marriage who was 
adopted by the Defendant in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May 
23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15, 
1982. 
7. During the marric'iye, the Plaintiff could not pursue her 
formal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in 
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at 
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various times during the marriage to assist in the support of the 
family, and due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant for a 
major portion of the tiipe. 
The parties acquired few household furnishings, 
appliances or other personal property during the marriage. 
Hdl For approximately the two years after the parties were 
divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required 
and received public assistance. 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has done an 
admirable job of caring for and educating the parties minor 
children. 
(T^) The Court finds that the Plaintiff and the minor 
children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the 
divorce. 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant 
personal sacrifices to further her education since the time of 
the divorce. After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors 
degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in 
1989. Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D. Length of time for 
/completion of this course of study will depend on course 
requirements. 
12. The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in 
an effort to maximize her income potential. The testimony and 
evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the 
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field 
will be difficult without additional education and that even with 
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additional education, employment opportunities are projected to 
be limited in the future. 
13. During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-
time employee and had a gross income of $9,600:00. 
14. In 1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where 
he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and 
gynecology in that vicinity. 
15. During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant 
was able to provide a tax return, the Defendant had a gross 
income of $128,437.00. The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised 
of wagps he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately 
6 months, at the Huerly Medical Center in Michigan, and from the 
private practice of medicine. The Defendant earned $112,406.00 
from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of 
practice. 
16. The earnings of the Defendant as well jg^ jjjjs-..future 
potential have been considered by the court for the purpose of 
determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified. 
17. The Defendant's present income is not completely clear 
b\it the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross income 
can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year but 
certainly under no circumstances less than approximately 
$120,000.00 per year. 
18. The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a 
Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a 
similar amount to a retirement plan in 1988. 
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19. The^purA^inds^tha^E^there^has^b^ett • a substantially 
change of circtiistances^fn ^ the parties'income since the time ofr 
the divorce. 
20. Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification 
of the decree of divorce is warranted. The Court does not, 
however, find it necessary to invoke the theory of "Equitable 
Restitution" as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is 
it necessary to the Court to invoke the provisions of the 
original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest 
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the 
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff and the 
minor children are sufficient to justify a modification of the 
decree. 
21. Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of 
the children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be 
increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the judicial 
district's support guidelines. 
22. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has an adjusted 
gross part-time income of $800.00 per month and that the 
Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of 
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month. 
23. The proportionate share of the parties combined income 
is 10% and 90% for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively. 
24. The Court finds that based upon the Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child 
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the 
minor children Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of 
$504.00 for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total 
child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor 
children. The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines, 
should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,549.00 for child 
support. The Court further finds that the amount of child 
support for Corinne should increase to the sum of $607.00 per 
month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of 
age on that date. Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the 
Defendant's child support obligation will increase to $1,638.00 
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child. 
25. The Court further finds that pursuant to the support 
guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25* during those periods which 
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more 
days with the minor child(ren). 
26. The Court finds that at the time of the hearing the 
Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in 
y/ excess of $3,000.00 and that theCglaintif f' s residence was in 
jeopardy of being sold by the county for back property taxes; N 
that the Plaintiff is nine payments behind on her mortgage 
payments; that the Plaintiff has incurred substantial debts for 
medicajL^ dental and orthodontic expenses for the children; that 
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in 
poor condition and is in need ot substantial and major repairs,~ 
including repairs to the roof, foundatiojvr interior and exterior 
walls and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home, 
as well as other repairs; and, that the Plaintiff and the 
children are in need of^new appliances and household furnishings, 
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also. 
new clothing and shoes. ._.-. 
The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as 
when the Decree was entered. 
27. The Court finds that at the time of the modification 
hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of 
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need 
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial 
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce. 
28. The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the 
monthly alimony to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 per 
month. Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989. 
29. The Court further finds that the Defendant should be 
required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor 
children of the parties. The Court further finds that it is 
equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including 
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental insurance 
should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded 
to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's 
fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred 
herein. 
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31. The Court finds that that the Plaintiff's Counsel's 
fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering 
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues, 
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable. 
32. That the Court did not consider whether alimony should 
be terminated but would entertain further hearing upon 
application of either party or future petitions for modification. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial change of circumstances 
since the Decree of Divorce was originally entered in this 
matter. 
2. It is fair and reasonable, based upon the change of 
circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant should be increased in accordance with the schedules 
set forth in the child support guidelines. 
3. The child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff for support of the parties minor children should 
increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor 
children. The amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor 
children should be increased to the amount of $1,638.00 per 
month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989. 
4. The Plaintiff has endured and continues to endure 
significant and substantial hardships and has made significant 
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she 
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has a significant and substantial need at present and in the 
future for an increase in alimony, 
5. It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony 
payable from the Defendant to the Plaintiff be increased to 
$1,350.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989• 
6. The Defendant should provide health, accident and 
dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical 
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not 
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7. It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded 
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred 
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GREG S. ERrCKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Ut 84010 
Telephone:(801)295-6841 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DFANNA FOXLEY, } AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT FARR 
Plaintiff, j 
) CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
vs. } 
) JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF rTTAtf ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
COMES NOW Robert Farr, who being duly placed under oat1 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. That on about March, 1985, I became acquainted with one 
Deanne. Foxley. 
2. During the course of 3 years from March, 1985 to about 
July, 1988, I saw her socially. 
3. That during the period that I knew her, she informed me 
that she was involved in a court action with her ex-husband, Bill 
Foxley. 
4. That during the course of our involvement she confided 
the following information to me. 
A, That she had to appear as if she was destitute in 
order to get a big settlement from her ex-husband. 
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B. She told me that she had turned down Job offers 
that would have paid her $40,000.00 per year until after the 
court case with Bill Foxley was completed. 
C. She told me that she borrowed money for her 
education to make it appear that she was rehabilitating herself. 
D. She told me that she kept her work hours to a 
minimum so it would appear that she earned very little. 
E. She told me that she would not disclose the fact 
.that she had other income from other jobs to Bill's attorney. 
F. She told me that her attorney advised her to open 
a secret bank account that would not disclose all of her money 
that she had or earned. 
She told me that she would not tell Bill's 
attorney about the bank account but that it would be kept secret. 
The bank account was kept at Utah Bank & Trust 
iindi»r thp name of Deanna Foxley and her daughter Kristine Foxley. 
6. That she obtained copies of cases from her 
attorney so she could read them. 
5. That in April, 1989 I contacted Greg S. Ericksen with 
this information. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
k 
0BERT S. FARR * 
2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
• 
The undersigned be^ng a Notary Public does hereby certify 
that on "this day of May, 1989, personally appeared before 
me, Robert Farr, who executed the foregoing Affidavit, 
NOTftRY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
T hereby certify that on this day of May, 1989 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit was mailed via first-
cl^ «=;s rp^ji. postage pr^-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at: 
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, ntah 84101. 
MARY PETERSEN 
MISC:Fox]ey-F.aff 
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
vs. 
WILLIAM FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. D 82 1591 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
* * * 
This cause cane on to be heard before the 
EONORAELE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges of the said 
Court, on the 1st day of June, 1989, when and where the 
following proceedings were had. 
* * * 
A P P E 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant; 
HR. ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney at Law 
50 West Third South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MR. GREG S. ERICKSEN 
Attorney at Law 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
HAL H. WALTON 
Registered Professional Reporter 
1 him. We provided to him the infonaation that he requested 
I « 
2 and lir. iiricksen did not make a motion to conipel, or pursue 
I « 
3 a motion to compel• We both filed then because we aave 
4 them what he asked for, 
5 And the face is, your Honor, if there was error, 
it was a harmless error. That second secret account, the 
eld account simply -had no money really going through it with 
8 J regard to chat, and this, I admit is a more thorny issue. 
9 I And that regards the airplane. £l'Ir. bricksen did ask, do you 
10 I have an interest in any business and ny client said no. And 
11 did anybody owe you any noney. Ay client out just,. I think, 
12 i>r. x'cxlcy* 
13 but I think there's s>cme background that's very 
14 important for the Court to understand what happened, howT this 
15 whole transaction came about. ;:r. I'arr, as we indicated in 
16 cur affidavit, was an acquaintance, and more than an 
17 acquaintance of J-eanna loxley. Ar. Tarr in fact asked him— 
18 askec her to marry him on several occasions. While they were 
19 dating, 1-lr. Farr said why don!t you give me sortie money and 
20 we'll have this airplane. We111 ce able to rent it and we.111 
21 I make a lot of money. This is a smaii airplane and can be 
used— 
23 I 21K. r,AibAb^N: Objection, your Honor. rfhis is agaiji 
24 going in to testimony. 
25 y:;^  CuUVi;' boil, that's hearsay as well. 
22 
